The International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS) hosted a session on “Synthesis Screening: The Future of Writing and Hacking DNA” at the 2024 iGEM Responsibility Conference on October 24:
Synthetic biology runs on synthetic DNA. Whether ordered from a core facility or a commercial supplier, affordable and accessible synthetic DNA is needed to unlock the benefits of bioengineering. Synthetic sequences can also increase access to pathogens and toxins, raising concerns about accidents or misuse. Advances in AI allow us to design sequences in silico with little similarity to natural genomes, expanding the range of both benefits and risks. How should we safeguard the transition from digital designs to physical sequences? Can synthesis screening keep up?
The two-hour interactive workshop, chaired by IBBIS Technical Lead Tessa Alexanian and iGEM Program Coordinator Yorgo El Moubayed, began with a predictions exercise, where participants were asked to forecast timelines for key developments related to accessibility, the intersection of AI and biology, and governance of nucleic acid synthesis. Most notably:
- 58% of participants predicted that synthesis of 10kb custom DNA for less than 1 cent per base would be available by 2028-2030
- Participants disagreed strongly on when a benchtop synthesizer that can make fragments >50bp without needing proprietary reagents or highly skilled operators would be available, with 45% saying it already exists, and 30% predicting it would not be available until after 2030
- Participants broadly agreed that regulations requiring or strongly incentivising synthesis screening in major jurisdictions (“at least 3 of the China, EU, India, UK, USA”) would be implemented within the next decade, with 2026-2027 being the most popular prediction
The workshop then moved into an expert panel discussion, moderated by Sophie Peresson, in which panellists Jake Beal, Nikki Teran, Adam Clore, and Shrestha Rath shared provocative statements including that “AI is less of a threat than we fear, because it can’t change biochemistry” and “Accurate and transparent reporting by the media is a stronger incentive for synthesis screening than any fines or penalties imposed by law”.
After a “screening game” where participants took turns playing the roles of customer and screener, gaining hands-on experience with the practical challenges of DNA synthesis screening decisions, the workshop then shifted into small group discussions exploring consensus statements about DNA synthesis screening (handout available here). These discussions covered critical topics like customer verification requirements, risk profiling of sequences of concern (SOCs), and international harmonization of screening practices.
A key theme that emerged was the importance of shifting from merely democratizing biotechnology to democratizing biosecurity itself. Participants explored how different bioeconomies can take ownership of synthesis screening, adapting practices to local contexts while maintaining international standards. The workshop emphasized the “Swiss cheese model” of biosecurity, where multiple layers of defense – including screening tools, regulations, and customer verification – work together to create robust protection against potential threats.
The workshop slides and results from the predictions exercise can be accessed at this link. A detailed report of the conference proceedings, including insights from this session, is expected to be released by on the iGEM website at a later date.
Photo from the iGEM Foundation on Flickr.